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For a large part of the twentieth century, the phenomenological tradition in so-called ‘continental’ 
philosophy was seen as one which analytic philosophers in the English-speaking world could safely 
disregard. Whereas Edmund Husserl, a founding figure in the movement, had been influential both in 
Germanophone and Francophone philosophy during his own lifetime, British and American philosophy 
did not, as we shall see, welcome his influence until much later.
Introduction 
1 It was only brought to the surface during 
the fifties that Husserl had engaged in correspondence with Gottlob Frege,2 with the ensuing discussion of 
Frege’s influence on Husserl’s anti-psychologism resulting in hundreds of academic papers and books.3 
Furthermore, it turns out that various leading figures in analytic philosophy, such as Gilbert Ryle and 
Rudolf Carnap, were in fact at least partly influenced by Husserl at some stage in their careers, while 
others still, such as Wittgenstein or Austin, had at times employed the term ‘phenomenology’ as a 
description of their own work in philosophy.4 Rather than encourage the study of the continental 
phenomenological tradition, the engagement of these figures with Husserl has in most cases had the 
opposite effect.5
There may be various philosophical reasons for this troubled relation, and I have elsewhere explored 
its causes in depth.
 Nevertheless, contemporary phenomenology may be said to be studied more in 
philosophy departments within the Anglophone world, which are affiliated with an analytic 
metaphilosophy, and less so under the banner of what has come to be called ‘continental’ philosophy. 
6 In this paper I focus on one particular occurrence, or rather non-occurrence, which 
contributed to the ill-fated reception of Husserl’s thought in Britain. In what follows, I examine the 
circumstances around Bertrand Russell’s projected review of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen while 
serving his sentence at Brixton prison in 1918. I will be illustrating the relation between Russell’s failure 
to produce this review and the subsequent reception of Husserl’s presentation of his work to a British 
audience. The story ties together various historical factoids related to T. E. Hulme’s opposition to 
Russell’s pacifism, the international debate over the legacy of German Idealism, Russell’s imprisonment, 
and Husserl’s unfortunate arrival in Britain as the first Germanophone philosopher to visit the country 
after the war. Recounting this story shows that the Anglophone response to Husserl’s thought was shaped 
to a lesser degree by matters relevant to philosophical argument than it was by various contingent 
historical factors. 
Let us first consider the background of Russell’s relation to phenomenology. It is well known that 
Russell’s ‘On Denoting’, published in Mind in 1905, had taken Meinong and his theory of objects 
[Gegenstandtheorie] as the target of its attack. Meinong, along with a large number of other important 
Germanophone philosophers and psychologists of his time (including for example Husserl and Freud) had 
studied under Franz Brentano, founder of the phenomenological tradition that Husserl would later reform. 
Meinong’s school, based in Graz, may be seen as one of the branches of the phenomenological tradition 
Russell and phenomenology 
springing from the work of Brentano, albeit one that remained marginal (if not wholly irrelevant) to the 
subsequent development of phenomenology from Husserl to Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, and so on.7 By 
discussing Meinong’s view of ideal entities (such as the ‘golden mountain’) that subsist rather than exist, 
Russell introduced the doctrines of this Austrian school to Anglophone philosophy. Nevertheless, his 
polemical treatment of Meinong could be seen as relegating this school to the realm of a ‘woolly’ type of 
thinking that is predominantly located on the ‘continent’. It may be said that the style in which Russell 
deals with Meinong sets a precedent for later dealings with continental thinkers by analytic philosophers 
(e.g. Ayer’s claims that Sartre and Heidegger’s talk of ‘nothingness’ is nonsensical).8 And, in close 
parallel to its legacy (which in many cases has been one of directing one’s fire against an enemy more 
distant than the one it is in fact aimed at), it has been argued that Russell’s response to Meinong 
misconstrues Meinong’s thought in a way which more closely resembles a younger Russell’s idealist 
views than those explicitly put forth by Meinong.9
Though Russell’s exchange with Meinong is one of the most well known historical ties linking 
Russell to the phenomenological tradition, there is more to Russell’s relation to phenomenology than 
simply a polemical dispute. David Bell has pointed out the ties between Russell and Moore’s rebellion 
against their Hegelian predecessors, and their relation to Germanophone reactions against the rise of 
experimental psychology (having in mind the phenomenological tradition in particular).
 
10 Stout and 
Ward, two of the figures who were most influential on Russell and Moore, though later rejected as 
‘British Idealists’, were in dialogue with Brentano and in fact imported Brentano’s thought into a British 
context.11 Indeed, Bell argues that Stout’s conception of analytical psychology, which so influenced 
Moore’s conception of analytical philosophy, was in fact an introduction of Brentano’s ideas to an 
Anglophone audience.12 And though subsequent portrayals of the birth of analytic philosophy see it as 
somehow being a particularly British philosophical revolution (with British realists rebelling against 
British idealists), it would be more accurate, according to Bell, to consider what later came to be called 
‘analytic philosophy’ as having arisen from Moore and Russell’s participation in a dialogue over the 
emergence of empirical psychology that first took place amongst philosophers, psychologists, and 
logicians on continental Europe. 
This relation between the birth of analytic philosophy and the development of phenomenology was 
only recently paid substantial attention, through the interest in the history of early analytic philosophy that 
has developed in the past two decades or so. There is, nonetheless, one exceptional figure, contemporary 
to Russell, who had seen Russell’s and Moore’s thought to be related to Husserl’s. The modernist poet, 
critic, and self-professed dilettante philosopher T. E. Hulme had also been an importer of German and 
French thought into Britain. Hulme had been a persona non grata at Cambridge: he had been expelled, 
and went on to travel around Europe, eventually bringing his impressions from Europe’s intellectual 
scene back home. His central importing activity had been that of translating Bergson’s Introduction to 
Metaphysics into English - an import which had partly been blocked by Russell’s criticisms of Bergson in 
1908.
Hulme and Russell 
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Hulme saw various parallels between Russell and Moore, on the one hand, and Husserl, on the other. 
Hulme had correctly viewed the anti-psychologistic outlooks that drove early analytic philosophy in 
Britain as comparable with the overall anti-psychologistic climate in Germanophone philosophy. In 
particular, he thought that Husserl’s anti-psychologism in logic went hand-in-hand with Moore’s anti-
psychologism in ethics.
 
14 Furthermore, Hulme had deemed that Husserl’s idea of phenomenology as a 
rigorous science was aligned with Russell’s ideas regarding scientific philosophy.15
There are two or three reasons why Hulme’s association of Russell with Husserl did not catch on. 
The first, and more tragic, is the fact that Hulme was killed by a bomb in Oostduinkerke in 1917 while 
fighting in the First World War on the side of Britain.
 Though this may not 
have been precisely correct, Hulme had pointed the way towards a comparison which historians of 
analytic philosophy would only seriously take into consideration more than half a century later. 
16 The second reason is not unrelated, but rather a 
link in the causal chain that led to Hulme’s death. Hulme had been polemically opposed to Russell on the 
matter of the war. Yet Hulme’s opposition to Russell seems to have pre-dated their clash on the war. 
Indeed, it appears to lie at the root of Russell’s critique of Bergson (since Russell’s attack on Bergson 
targeted British Bergsonians such as Hulme, rather than Bergson himself).17
The story of Russell’s disagreement with Hulme over the war is striking. With the start of the war, 
Hulme seems to have picked up a kind of proto-futurist fascination with war, and became one of its 
staunch proponents. It is this fascination that led him to enlist for military service, and eventually to his 
death. Russell, on the other hand, as is well known, had vehemently opposed the war and refused 
conscription. This had led to a public polemical exchange, in the pages of The New Age and The 
Cambridge Magazine between Russell and Hulme, who had written pseudonymously as North Staffs.
 
18 
Their clash included Hulme’s attending one of Russell’s 1915 lectures against the war at Cambridge, 
during which he seems to have thought it appropriate to demonstrate his opposition to Russell’s views by 
conspicuously reading his newspaper throughout Russell’s lecture.19 
It is well known that Russell’s opposition to the war had led him into trouble. Russell became a 
vehement opponent of conscription, and had participated in pacifist demonstrations. 
The war and Russell’s imprisonment 
The fact that Russell had opposed the war put him in a position vastly different from that of most 
intellectuals, especially philosophers, of his time, not only in the British context but throughout the world. 
The First World War was, for many, not only one that would be fought in the trenches, but also to be 
fought with pen and paper at the level of intellectual polemic.20 There was, for example, at the start of the 
war, that well-known manifesto signed by ninety-three German intellectuals (including many 
philosophers) defending Prussia’s militarism in the names of Goethe, Beethoven, and Kant.21 
Furthermore, under its Defence of the Realm Act, Britain not only prohibited the teaching of German at 
schools, but also banned all books written in the German language.  
The war had been conceived by some of Germany’s leading philosophers as one that German 
‘Kultur’ was ethically obliged to fight against the mere ‘civilisations’ of France and Britain. The heads of 
Germany’s Neo-Kantian schools, including Hermann Cohen, Paul Natorp, and Wilhelm Windelband, saw 
the war as a struggle between British and French technological civilisation opposed to a German ethico-
philosophical culture that German Idealism had given rise to. Thus an international controversy would 
ensue, and it is notable that leading philosophers such as John Dewey in America and Emile Boutroux in 
France participated in the discussion. In Britain a number of writers would throw the blame for Prussian 
militarism onto Kant and Hegel.22 Yet, though Russell was no friend of German Idealism, his position 
against the war would mean that he did not participate in the British outcry against Kant and Hegel at this 
time.23
Russell’s opposition to the war would eventually lead, on 9 February 1918, to his being charged for 
violating the 1914 Defense of the Realm Act. Russell was tried and sentenced to imprisonment, which he 
served for five months in Brixton Prison. During this time, Russell had continued his philosophical work, 
while a lot of his time was apparently devoted to preparation for a future career as a public intellectual. 
 
Russell took with him a copy of the second volume of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen to 
Brixton prison.
Brixton Prison and the projected review of Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen 
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Russell’s resistance to the war had in fact placed him in a unique position for producing this review: 
he had been one of the few intellectuals who, at the time, could afford to write favourably of a 
Germanophone  author. Russell, as we have seen, had already been an importer into Britain of 
Germanophone thought (i.e. Frege and Meinong) prior to the war, and, it has been claimed, had been 
influenced by the Germanophone dialogue over the relation between philosophy and psychology that 
 Russell read Husserl’s magnum opus with the intention of preparing a review that would 
be published in Mind. Though Russell later claims that he did read Husserl work, for reasons that remain 
unknown, he did not write the review. 
Husserl’s work had brought to the fore. In addition to the above, it was already the case that Russell and 
Moore’s views had come to be compared to those developed by Husserl, particularly insofar as anti-
psychologism was concerned. And this anti-psychologistic thesis was one that Husserl advanced in the 
work that Russell was to review. 
Russell’s reading of Husserl’s work did lead to some brief contact between the two philosophers. On 
April 19 1920, Russell composed an apparently spontaneous letter to Husserl (currently held in the 
Louvain Archives), in which he reports that he had read Husserl’s work while in prison, and that though 
he had intended to review it for Mind, this did not happen after all.25
Four years later, in his article titled ‘Philosophy in the Twentieth Century’,
 In the letter, Russell also 
acknowledges Husserl’s interest in his own work. 
26
 
 Russell praises 
Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen: 
But with the year 1900 a revolt against German idealism began, not from a pragmatist point of view, 
but from a severely technical standpoint. In Germany, apart from the admirable works of Frege 
(which begin in 1879, but were not read until recent years), Husserl’s Logische Untersuchungen, a 
monumental work published in 1900, soon began to exert a great effect.[...] In England, G.E. Moore 
and I began to advocate similar views.27
 
 
Not only does Russell call Husserl’s book ‘a monumental work’, but he also places it alongside his 
own work, as well as that of Moore, James, Meinong, Frege, and others who contributed to the demise of 
German Idealism. 
Nonetheless, by the time Russell published this, it was too little, too late. Despite this brief positive 
appraisal of the importance of Husserl’s work by Russell, the fate of its dissemination in Britain was to 
encounter further obstacles. 
Two years prior to Russell’s praise, Husserl had been the first Germanophone philosopher to visit 
England after the war. Husserl had actively sought to make contact with British philosophers, and had 
arranged for a lecture series to be presented in London. He thus came to present four lectures at 
University College London in 1922, under the title of 
Husserl’s 1922 visit to Britain 
Phenomenological Method and Phenomenological 
Philosophy. 28 The lecture series was considered a fiasco.29 Husserl’s failure to engage the British public 
may be partly attributed to the fact that, though Husserl had produced various ‘introductions’ to 
phenomenology, they were not as introductory as the title suggests. Husserl described phenomenology as 
a ‘transcendental idealism’ which might have misled his audience of British philosophers (most of whom 
had not yet read Husserl’s magnum opus, which Russell did not review for Mind) into thinking this an apt 
description of his overall views. The fact that the first Germanophone philosopher to visit Britain after the 
war called himself a ‘transcendental idealist’ did not sit well with the audience at UCL. 
The various historical factoids that I have recounted in this paper shift emphasis away from this 
problematic image of philosophy as divided into two camps that Ryle and others had generated in the 
fifties. They show instead that there are accidental historical complexities, often having little or nothing to 
do with philosophy, that have determined the way philosophy is conceived today. The missed 
opportunities in the attempted import of Husserl’s thought into an Anglophone context, constitutive as 
There was, nonetheless, one philosopher in the audience who would go on to study and teach 
Husserl at Oxford: this was Gilbert Ryle who, despite having been influenced by Husserl, would 
nonetheless eventually come to be among the first philosophers to, not un-problematically, diagnose the 
existence of a gulf between what he called ‘Anglo-Saxon’ and ‘Continental’ philosophy. 
they were of subsequent construal of an ‘analytic-continental divide’, are not, as has been shown above, 
primarily matters of philosophical dispute. 
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